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[Cybersecurity Landscape: Social Engineering Remains Top Threat

[Cybersecurity Landscape

Pubblicato il Elaborato da Sebastiano, GoYou.it 4 min di lettura

IN BREVE

  • [cybersecurity-landscape
Cybersecurity Landscape: Social Engineering Remains Top Threat Recent findings in the 2025 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report: Social Engineering Edition reveal that 36% of all incidents begin with a social engineering tactic. This includes phishing, vishing, search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning, fake system prompts and help desk manipulation. The incident, which involved the modification of direct-deposit details, began with a phone call. The organization, a leading provider of IT services, noticed that employees were complaining about missing paychecks. It turned out that an attacker had modified direct-deposit details in order to redirect an organization’s paychecks into attacker-controlled accounts. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’ social engineering tactic was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared services. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk, which traced suspicious account changes dating back weeks. The organization engaged legal counsel, who referred them to Unit 42 to conduct a full-scope investigation. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersonated employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices. The threat actor’s initial access was not gained through a technical breach but rather through a social engineering campaign. The attacker impersoned employees to manipulate multiple help desks, including those for payroll, IT and HR shared. They then tricked the help desk personnel by successfully circumventing the challenge/start-response authentication into performing password resets and re-enrolling multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices.

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