The US Defense Budget 2027: A Debt Burdening Future Generations

The Dilemma of the US Defense Budget: Future Costs and Strategic Choices

As the US Congress debates the 2027 defense budget, lawmakers must face a crucial reality: it will be their children and grandchildren who will pay the bill. Many of the resources that will be allocated for military purposes in 2027 will be financed through public debt, adding to an already concerning national deficit. However, this is only one aspect of the problem.

The defense policies adopted today become spending obligations for future generations. If members of Congress are considering $1.5 trillion for defense in 2027, it is partly because they must cover the costs derived from decisions made years ago by people who are no longer in office. An emblematic example is the contract for the Joint Strike Fighter, awarded to Lockheed Martin almost a quarter of a century ago.

The Hidden Costs of the F-35 Program

The F-35 program is often cited for its high costs and the doubling of expenses since 2001. However, the real costs of the program are yet to manifest. Defense acquisition programs generally follow the so-called "Rule of Thumb": one-third of the total costs of a program is represented by development, testing, and acquisition, while the remaining two-thirds are constituted by operational and support costs, less publicized but equally significant.

In the case of the F-35, the development and acquisition costs amount to approximately $442 billion. However, the projected operational and support costs for the entire duration of the program are estimated at $1.58 trillion. This represents a significant challenge for Congress, which must manage the increase in defensive spending started at the beginning of the century, while continuing to invest in new programs that will generate future costs.

New Programs and the Problem of Future Costs

In addition to the F-35, Congress is evaluating other costly programs such as the modernization of the nuclear triad, the Golden Dome missile defense system, a new class of battleships, and the F-47 fighter program. These new programs are currently in the relatively inexpensive phase of development and acquisition. However, when they become operational in the next 20-30 years, the American people will have to face their true costs.

The only way to control these future costs is for policymakers today to make difficult choices. All currently proposed programs must be evaluated based on their practicality and real security needs. A good starting point could be the re-evaluation of the aeronautical programs currently in development.

The "Platform/Ordnance" Assessment

The B-21 and F-47 programs should undergo a fundamental re-evaluation based on a cost assessment that can be called the "platform/ordnance equation." This simple assessment considers the cost of the launch platform and the ordnance that is launched towards a target. In the case of the B-21, the estimated cost per aircraft is approximately $700 million. Precision-guided munitions, such as guided gravity bombs, cost between $25,000 and $84,000 each, depending on the size of the bomb and the number of bombs purchased.

In this scenario, a $700 million platform, piloted by two people, flies through a heavily defended airspace directly above the target to drop an $84,000 bomb. This contrasts with a B-52, with an inflation-adjusted cost of approximately $139 million per aircraft. A B-52 crew can remain outside the enemy's defense zone and launch an AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile worth $1 million. The JASSM, or "Jazz-em," has a range of at least 230 miles and was specifically designed to prevent piloted aircraft from flying directly into heavily defended areas.

Alternatives to Manned Aircraft

In addition to manned aircraft and long-range bombs and missiles, there are many other ways to deliver ordnance to distant targets in the 21st century. Military planners can choose from long-range rocket artillery such as HIMARS, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones. In the near future, the army will also have a wide range of hypersonic missiles.

Considering all available options, the idea of sending manned aircraft like the B-21 or F-47 to perform missions that can be carried out by a cruise missile or a drone makes little sense. Policymakers should carefully reflect on the future of military aviation when deliberating on the type of obligations they contract for the next generations.

The three individuals who saddled today's Americans with the F-35 boondoggle all belonged to the Silent Generation. It would be a great shame if the Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials in Congress now did the same with Generations Z and Alpha, as well as the generations that follow.

Manned bombers have been obsolete for years. Attack aircraft face an equally uncertain future. Just because the United States has maintained large fleets of such aircraft in the past does not mean it should continue to do so. The army abandoned horse cavalry. The navy replaced battleships with aircraft carriers. It is time for policymakers to undertake a similar process with aviation to ensure that the platform/ordnance math works correctly.